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APPE NDIX H I 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN FAMILY 
COURTS 
Barbara A. Babb' 
Judith B. Moran" 
I. Introduction 
Judicial independence has become an increasingly important area of 
concern forcourt reformers , academics, the bench, and the bar.' 
Professional associations, such as the American Bar Association and 
the American Judicature Society, have begun initiatives to focus on 
the issue, as have citizens groups. 2 Several law journals have pub-
lished symposia on the topic, as well.' 
Court reform initiatives are an integral part of judicial independence 
in the family court context, and, in fact. they have the potential to 
facilitate an autonomous family court judiciary. Professor Barbara 
Babb has written extensively on family court reform" She posits that 
some statewide family court reform projects , notably one that recent-
ly was implemented in Maryland . have supported improved judicial 
selection processes. This process now includes a focus on the candi -
date's background in and temperament for handling family law mat-
te rs. Arguably, judges who are familiar with and interested in family 
law will be less subject to the political and social forces that influence 
family law decision - making. 
The independence of the family court judiciary is influenced by mul-
tipl e factors , whi ch encompass some of socie ty's most deeply held 
b elie fs .5 These include issues such as th e age at which minors should 
b e subj ect to criminal responsibility and punishment, the grounds 
for m a rital dissolution , gender- related issu es in child custody 
awards, and child rearing standards that d e fin e child abuse and n eg-
lect. In addition to these philosophical and m o ral judgments, family 
law d eciSio n - m aking also is influenced by th e method of judicial 
, 
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selection, the scope of a particular family court's subject matter juris-
diction, community norms and concerns, the expectations of society 
for judicial decision-making, and the manner in which judges con-
duct their personal lives. 
Most discourses on judicial independence focus on judicial elec-
tions and the adverse consequences of selecting judicial officers via 
this method. The presumption is that when a judge is appointed, she 
will be freer to make decisions notwithstanding political forces. This 
assumption, however, may not be particularly relevant in the family 
court context. In this context, the decisions made are affected not 
only by external forces, such as community norms and political 
issues, but by internal factors resulting from a judge's personal expe-
rience in her own family. Each judge, after all, is herself the priduct 
of a family, and, presumably, she relates to many of the issues that 
bring families to court. Personal biases borne out of particular cir-
cumstances are bound to impact a judge's thinking. 
Even if these internal forces are managed, the appointment process 
as opposed to the election process in and of itself does not support 
judicial independence. Consider the family court judge appointed by 
a state or local government official who has an interest in lowering 
the juvenile crime rate. When faced with a delinquency case, that 
judge is likely to be influenced by the person to whom she "owes" her 
seat on the bench. Overall, the most important factor regarding judi-
cial independence in the family court context, however, may be that 
we do not want judges to have so much discretion in family law mat-
ters. As a result of our ambivalence, we tether their decisions to 
statutes, which circumscribe their roles. 6 
This paper will discuss the particular factors that influence judicial 
independence in the family court context. First, the paper addresses 
procedural mechanisms by which an individual becomes a judge. 
Second, family court jurisdiction and its relationship to the issue of 
judicial autonomy are addressed. Third, the paper discusses the 
impact of social norms and political forces on particular aspects of 
family law decision-making. Finally, the effect of the media, the 
expectations the public has for judges, and legislative influences on 
judicial discretion are noted. 
6 SeeJohnJ. Sampson. Bringing the Courts to Heel: Substituting Legislative Poliryfor Judicial Discretion, 33 FAM. L. Q. 
565 (1999) (noting the trend towards legislative control over family law decision-making). 
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II. Factors InfluencingJudicial Independence in the FaInily 
Court Context 
Method of Tudicial Selection 
.... 
The way in which an individual becomes a family court judge varies 
from state to state. In Maryland, for example, judges are appointed 
by the governor for a one-year term and then are subject to a "reten-
tion election"7 for the remaining fourteen-year term of office. Judges: 
who survive the election process are then selected by the administra-
tive judge in each Circuit Court to sit in that court's Family Division 
for an eighteen-month period. In contrast, New York City's Family 
Court judges are appointed by the mayor. As John Sampson has 
noted, "We now have in this country a patchwork quilt of judicial 
selection methods ."8 The most popular selection method appears to 
be the electoral process. 9 
Although reformers criticize the election of judges in so far as it has 
the potential to erode judicial independence, appointing family court 
judges does not guarantee an independent judiciary. Family court 
judges are not immune to outside influences, as they are susceptible 
to political pressures brought to bear by the elected officials who 
make decisions about the composition of the family court bench. As 
stated above, in New York City the mayor determines the make-up of 
the Family Court judiciary. A recent analysis of Family Court judicial 
appointments by former Mayor Giuliani has highlighted the extent to 
which his Family Court appointments have reflected his crime con-
trol agenda. Daniel Wise states in a recent New York Law Journal 
article that "[s]omewhat more consistently than his predecessors, 
practitioners said, Mr. Giuliani has appointed lawyers who spent a 
large part of their careers as prosecutors, either of criminal cases 
against adults or juvenile delinquency cases in Family Court."lo 
Family Court Turisdiction 
The breadth of a family court's jurisdiction varies from state to state. 
In some statesII family courts have the authority to decide all matters 
relating to family law. 12 In others, family court subject matter juris-
7 See id. at 584. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. (noting that about forty-two states utilize this process). 
IO See Daniel Wise. Lauyers Find Smart. CommiHedJudges in Court Defined ~ Tension. N .Y.L.J. 
March 19. 2002 at I. 
II See Babb. supra note 4. at 471 [citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 921-928 (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 11-1101 (1995). §§ 16-2301 to 16-2365 (1997); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 571-11 to 571-14 (1993)]. 
12 See id. (Defining family law as cases involving divorce. annulment and property distribution; child 
custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity. adoption. and termination of parental 
rights; juvenile delinquency. child abuse and child neglect; domestic violence; criminal non-support; 
name change; guardianship of minors and disabled persons; and withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical procedures. involuntary admissions and emergency evaluations). 
.... 11 
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diction is limited to deciding matters relating to child protection and 
dependency, juvenile delinquency, child custody and visitation. 13 
Conceivably, the scope of a family court's jurisdiction affects the 
degree to which a judge is influenced by the community at large and 
by discrete political constituencies, as well as the extent to which the 
public has confidence in family court decisions or outcomes. 
Family courts whose primary jurisdictional mandates are juvenile 
causes attract attention from communities focused on crime control 
and prevention. Consequently, judges may be influenced by anti-
crime initiatives that cause them to detain delinquent youth, rather 
than sentence them to probation and community-based rehabilita-
tion programs. Conversely, family courts wiih more expansive juris-
diction may be scrutinized on many levels, including issues of 
divorce, child custody, and family violence. One legal scholar opines 
that the more comprehensive the jurisdiction of the family court, the 
greater the public interest. 14 
A family court with comprehensive jurisdiction, however, may sup-
port an independent thinking judiciary and promote consumer con-
fidence in the court system. In her discussion of unified family 
courts, Professor Babb suggests that one of the values of the unified 
family court model is that it supports informed judicial decisions by 
making available to judges support staff with backgrounds in mental 
health and social work.15 These individuals assist the judge byassess-
ing families, thereby helping to ensure that the court issues decisions 
that are appropriate for the family's particular circumstances. 
Arguably, the result may be an increased public trust in the judges 
who decide family law cases, which, in turn, promotes their inde-
pendence. 
Conununit)' Norms/Political Forces 
Community norms and political forces influence nearly every area of 
family law. The more notable influences on particular family law case 
categories are discussed below. 
Ch.ild Protection 
Judicial decision-making in child protection matters clearly is influ-
enced by public policy. Laws reflective of how best to safeguard the 
welfare of children, while protecting the integrity of the family, guide 
family court judges to decide the critical issue of where to place a 
13 N.Y. Fam. Court Act §II5 (2001). 
14 See Interview with Barbara A. Babb, Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of 
Law, in Baltimore, MD (June 10, 2002). 
15 See Barbara A. Babb and Judith D. Moran, Substance Abuse, Families and the Courts: The Creation of a CaringJustice 
~stem, 3J. HEALTH CARE L. & Pol'y 1,18 (1999) . 
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neglected or abused child. "During certain periods in this century, 
emphasis has been placed on family integrity and the inviolability of 
parents' fundamental rights to the child in all but the most extreme 
circumstances of maltreatment. However, in other periods consider-
ations of the child's best interest have been used to j~stify high levels 
of state intervention in the parent-child relationsh~r' including 
removal of the child and placement in foster care.'" 
Currently, the trajectory of public policy has veer~d toward more 
state intervention in the lives of children and families. Permanency 
for children, the clarion call of the late 1990's, continues into the 
new century, resulting in less judicial discretion as to when to termi-
nate parental rights and to free a child for adoption. 17 
Prior to the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 
the lawl8 guiding family court judges in cases of child abuse and neg-
lect, although premised on permanency for children, allowed for 
considerable judicial discretion in determining when to permanently 
remove a child from her family. "Permanency planning meant that 
the state would make reasonable efforts to avoid the removal of chil-
dren from their parents through service plans, would closely monitor 
children in placement, and work to reunite parents and children 
through supportive services if placement occurred."19 This allowed 
judges to make more independent decisions about when to terminate 
parental rights. 
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 199720 heralded an era "of 
shorter and more stringent time requirements before actions would 
be taken to place children in permanent homes through adoption."21 
The 1997 law curtailed judges by imposing strict timelines on foster 
placement, as policymakers reacted to what they believed was an over-
reliance on preservation and reunification efforts. 22 Thus, the family 
court judge was divested of discretion to determine when parents 
must demonstrate they are fit to retain or regain custody of their 
child or permanently lose their parental rights. 
Cultural norms, as they relate to child rearing, also affect the adjudi-
cation of child abuse and neglect cases and circumscribe judicial 
16 See Robert F. Kelly, FamiJy Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child Protection Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, 
and Implicationsfor Legal Representation, Judicial Practice, and Public Polig, 34 FAM. L. Q. 359 (2000). 
17 See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89. 
18 See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272. 
19 See Kelly, supra note 16, at 364. 
20 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89. 
21 See Kelly, supra note 16, at 364. 
22 See id. 
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independence. Although state statutes ideally objectify parenting 
standards reflective of social norms, these laws can and do clash with 
child rearing practices in minority cultures. 23 Ajudge, although 
aware of the clash of cultural norms, may be forced to rule that cer-
tain behavior constitutes child neglect, dismissing evidence that a 
parent's particular ethnic orientation has influenced his behavior. 
Child Custody 
As there have been dramatic policy shifts in child welfare, there have 
been varying perspectives on child custody, as well. A review of the 
case law demonstrates the ebb and flow of judicial decision-making 
in this area of family law. The earliest cases devoted to custody deci-
sions demonstrate a paternal preference. 24 By the late nineteenth 
century,25 the cases reflect judicial veliance on the "tender years pre-
sumption," supporting routine custody awards to mothers of young 
children, as well as an inclination toward a maternal preference, 
regardless of the child's age. 26 At the 20th century's mid-point, his-
tory notes that courts craft decisions allowing for custody awards to 
the "psychological parent," yielding to social science research demon-
strating the value of a child residing with the parent with whom the 
child has the strongest emotional bond. Concurrently, the "best 
interests" standard, which continues to guide judges in custody deci-
sion-making, also has been favored. 
Although the "best interests" of the child is the overarching principle 
for custody decisions, 27 "[ t] 00 often, gender stereotypes playa role in 
custody determinations."28 With the advent of the father's rights 
movement in the I970s, yet another perspective on which parent is 
the preferable custodian has become part of the child custody debate. 
Owing to the substantial political activism stemming from the father's 
rights movement,29 the political ramifications of a custody award, 
rather than the "best interests" of the child, may influence judges 
faced with a custody dispute. 
Juvenile Delinquency 
With the advent of the crime control agenda, which has gained 
momentum over the last several decades, many state legislatures have 
23 See Yilu Zhao, Cultural Divide Over Parental Discipline, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at B3. 
24 See Shannon Dean Sexton, A Custoqy ~stem Free of Gender Preferences and Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child: 
Suggestions for a More Protective and Equitable Custoqy ~stem, 88 Ky. L.J. 761, 765 (1999-2000) (noting that 
under English common law the father was the preferred custodian and that this perspective permeated 
colonial American jurisprudence). 
25 See id. at 768. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. at 771. 
28 See id. at 76 2. 
29 See id. at 770 (describing the movement to influence state and federal legislators to retool custody laws 
so that they are more favorable to fathers). 
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responded by enacting laws to impose stiffer punishments on youth-
ful offenders. Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund state in their 
report on juvenile offenders that" [p]erceptions of the juvenile crime 
epidemic in the early I990's fueled public scrutiny of the system's 
ability to effectively control violent juvenile offenders. As a result, 
states have adopted numerous legislative changes in an effort to crack 
down on juvenile crime."30 . 
The sweep of changes in juvenile crime l~gislation between I992 and 
I997 encompassed nearly every state in the country.31 These revisions 
to existing statutes resulted in the following: making it easier to pros-
ecute juveniles in adult criminal courts, expanding sentencing alter-
natives, decreasing restrictions on the confidentiality of juvenile pro-
ceedings, increasing the role of victims, and modifying correctional 
programs. 32 
The manner in which the courts handle juvenile offenders is based 
on two approaches, both of which involve judicial discretion. In each 
instance, the issue is whether the juvenile is tried in an adult court 
and, if so, how that occurs. Two states, Tennessee and New York, are 
illustrative of the differences. In New York, 33 the crime committed 
and the age of the child are automatic determinants of where the 
youth is tried. For example, commission of murder in the second 
degree at age thirteen compels a trial in an adult criminal court. The 
statute does, however, provide for transfer to juvenile court if "the 
court determines that to do so would be in the interests of justice."34 
The statute lists factors for the court to consider, but, clearly, judicial 
discretion is operative in this circumstance. Judges in Tennessee also 
are called upon to use discretion in determining whether a juvenile 
offender is tried in an adult criminal court. In a departure from New 
York law, judges in Tennessee have the discretion to transfer the case 
to the adult criminal court after a hearing on the issue. 35 
Notwithstanding the different mechanisms for applying adult crimi-
nal justice procedures to juvenile causes, judges are likely to be held 
accountable by the community for the kind of justice-juvenile or 
adultt-to which the youthful offender is subject. Because the focus of 
juvenile courts is rehabilitation and not punishment, allowing a juve-
30 See Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report, NATIONAL 
CENTER FORJUVENILEJUSTICE, September 1999 at 85. 
31 See id. at 89 (noting that all but three states changed at least one aspect of the laws governing the 
adjudication of juvenile criminal offenders). 
32 See id. 
33 See NY CLS CPL § 1.20, § 210.4-3 2. (a)-(i) (2002). 
34 See NY CLS CPL § 210.4-3 db) (2002). 
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nile offender to remain in the juvenile system or returning her to it 
could cast the judge in a "soft on crime" light. Arguably, given soci-
ety's crime control agenda, judges resist being independent decision-
makers in this circumstance. 
Marital Dissolution 
Some of the most difficult decisions judges make in family law cases 
are those relating to the legal severance of the marital relationship. 
The difficulties arise from the fact that marital dissolution, particu-
larly when children are involved, presents a plethora of issues. The 
legal outcomes have substantial long-term consequences, such as how 
and by whom the children are cared for, the economic well-being of a 
financially dependent spouse, and the fate of extended family rela-
tionships with children when grandparents and other relatives wish to 
maintain contact with them. 
The granting of the divorce itself, despite any of the aforementioned 
issues, is fraught with our national ambivalence about the sanctity of 
the marital bond. The most 90table examples are the recent state 
statutes providing for "covenant marriage," where those contemplat-
ing marria~e enter into agreements that make a divorce more difficult 
to obtain.3 In Louisiana, for example, the covenant marriage law 
limits the dissolution of the marital relationship to circumstances 
involving mostly fault-based grounds. 37 
Although covenant marriage as a legislative phenomenon is a rarity, 
many state statutes governing marital dissolution reflect our conflict-
ed attitudes about divorce. The fault grounds enumerated in these 
laws provide insight into the national psyche surrounding the rela-
tionship that "no man shall put asunder." An examination of fault 
grounds for divorce actions across several states reflects our collective 
wisdom-that only the most egregious acts or the most difficult of cir-
cumstances substantiate dissolving the marital relationship. In 
Maine, for example, the grounds for divorce include: "adultery; 
impotence; extreme cruelty; utter desertion continued for three con-
secutive years prior to the commencement of the action; and gross 
and confirmed habits of intoxication from the use of liquor or 
drugs."38 Even when irreconcilable differences exist, Maine provides 
for judicial discretion to order the couples to counseling. 39 It appears 
36 SeeMUZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2001), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-202 MICHIE (2001), LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273 (WEST 2001). 
37 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:237(c) (WEST 2001). 
38 See MAINE, 19-A M.R.S. § 9021 A-E (2001). 
39 See MAINE, 19-AM.R.S. § 902 2 (2001): Irreconcilable Differences; Counseling. "If one party alleges 
that there are irreconcilable marital differences and the opposing party denies that allegation, the 
court upon its own motion or upon motion of either party may continue the case and require both 
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that Maine favors reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, or at 
least a demonstration, with objective evidence that the marriage can-
not be saved. 40 
Maryland reveals that its public policy supports maintaining marital 
relationships by requiring the court's due diligence as to evidentiary 
findings. Maryland's evidentiary requirements for substantiating a 
divorce action include similar grounds as those numerated in the 
Maine statute, with the additional stricture of a corroborating witness 
to testify as to the grounds41 and a showing that "there is no reason-
able expectation of reconciliation."42 . 
"The prevailing wisdom on divorce.~ .. has, like other cultural atti-
tudes, changed along with the times."43 It is, however, difficult to 
gauge these shifting winds of change-whether they are favorable to 
divorce, as evidenced by no fault laws, or whether our values support 
making divorces more difficult to obtain. With a backdrop of fault-
based grounds for divorce in many states, H judges base their deci-
sions on laws with insidious moral underpinnings. The wiggle room 
in many statutes with fault - based grounds, such as what constitutes 
"cruelty of treatment,"45 gives judges discretion in decision-making 
both as to the form and substance of the divorce action. As noted 
above, in ,Maine a judge may compel the parties to attend marriage 
counseling. The decision to grant a divorce, or at least how to order 
the parties to proceed in obtaining one, is undoubtedly influenced by 
community norms. But divining those norms is difficult-judges who 
are too quick to grant a divorce may suffer reprisals from constituents 
whose moral compass veers in the direction of preserving the marital 
union, while judges who resist granting a divorce may be judged 
harshly, as well. In such a climate of uncertainty, it is not unreason-
able to conclude that independent judicial decision-making is threat-
ened by moral and social forces .. 
Fantily Violence 
Violence between spouses, or other domestic partners, accounts for a 
substantial caseload in most family courts. These cases present judges 
with immediate safety issues for women and children. The result of 
seeking a protective order can place the vulnerable party in danger no 
matter what the legal outcome. There have been many cases where the 
40 See id. "The counselor shall give a written report of the counseling to the court and to both parties. 
The failure or refusal of the party who denies irreconcilable difference to submit to counseling 
without good reason is prima facie evidence that the marital differences are irreconcilable." 
41 See MD. FAMILY LAw CODE ANN. § 7-101 (1999). 
42 See MD. FAMILY LAw CODE ANN. § 7-103 (1999). 
43 See Daphne Merkin. Can this Divorce Be Saved? THE NEW YORKER. April 22. 2002. at 192. 
H See CODE OF ALA. § 30-2-1. (2001); NY CLS DOM. REL. § 170 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 
(2001); NORTH CAROUNA § 50-5.1. 
45 See MD. FAMILY LAw CODE ANN. § 7-103 (7) (1999). 
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petitioner is killed leaving the courthouse after obtaining a protec-
tion order. Conversely, women whose petitions have been denied 
have suffered at the hands of their abusers. These high-stakes out-
comes are fodder for the media to cast a bright light on judicial deci-
sion-making in family matters. It is not surprising that judges them-
selves may feel besieged, as they are second-guessed about the wisdom 
of their decisions in these most difficult cases. Furthermore, there is 
anecdotal evidence from domestic violence advocates that political 
influences taint the judiciary regarding these matters. This appears to 
be true, particularly in small rural jurisdictions, where a judge's rela-
tionships in the community may impact whether to grant an order 
that will shed an unfavorable light on a family's private affairs. 
III. Other Influences 
Media Pressures 
Ajudge's worst nightmare may be to read that a youth she sentenced 
to probation committed a subsequent crime, or that a woman whose 
petition for an order of protection she denied was further harmed by 
her alleged batterer. The pressures of community norms and values 
are brought to bear in a more dramatic way when the news media 
reports the adverse consequences of a judicial decision. Although 
there may be no objective measurement to determine the effect of 
publicity, the independence 01 the judiciary clearly is compromised 
by media attention. 
In addition to family court decisions that spawn subsequent violent 
criminal acts, other family court matters are also grist for the media 
mill. High -profile divorce cases make good copy, and they frequently 
contain specific judicial decisions, such as custody awards, child sup-
port mandates, and findings of fault:4-6 As the wisdom of these deci-
sions often is debated in the public arena, the potential for this pub-
lic controversy to influ~nce a judge is very real, indeed. 
Changing Expectations of Tudicial Roles 
With the advent of a problem-solving approach to judicial decision-
making,47 spawned by the growth of specialized courts such as drug 
46 See Susan Saulny, 18 Months After Giuliani, Hanover Filesfor Divorce, Citing Adultery, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002, 
at B 3 (describing the specifics of the judge's decision regarding child support and spousal 
maintenance) . 
47 See National Conference of State Court Administrators, Resolution 4, Conference of Chief Justices, 
Resolution 22, In Support of Problem-Solving Courts, Conference of Chief Justices, at 
http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/resolutionproblemsolvingcts.html(resolving to spearhead the problem-
solving model for judicial decision-making). 
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courts,4-8 community courts,4-9 and mental health courts,50 a judge's 
role has changed dramatically. Criminal court judges presiding in 
drug courts may find themselves imposing sentences fashioned to 
rehabilitate a drug involved felon and monitoring his treatment 
regime. The expectations for family court judges, particularly those 
involved with child protection matters, often include a quasi-social 
work function. The judge is responsible to ensure that the family 
receives services, with the hope of keeping children in the home or 
facilitating their swift return to the family unit. 
There is burgeoning evidence that society's expectations of the judici-
ary have taken on another dimension. A recent news article devoted 
to the issue of an Arizona judge's marijuana use during the period of 
time within which he imposed two death sentences highlights the 
extent to which a judge's private life should be in the public domain. 51 
The federal appellate court challenge to one of the sentences has 
resulted in the court's upholding the defendant's death penalty 
appeal. Commenting upon the intru$tve aspects of the decision, 
Judge Alex Kozinski has noted in his dissenting opinion that "the 
decision invited intrusion into judg'~s' personallives."52 Echoing the 
concerns of the dissent, an Arizona Assistant Attorney General has 
opined that the decision could support inquiries about "all sorts of 
matters that might influence judicial decision making," including 
divorce. 53 
If the foregoing case promotes a trend toward the exploration of a 
criminal court judge's personal background, then the independence 
of the family court bench also may be at risk. Family law matters 
relate to iS9;Ues affecting a significant percentage of the population. 
Professor Babb notes that family law cases account for more than 
35% of the civil case filings in the nation's state courts. 54- In light of 
the high volume of this category of cases, it is likely that many family 
court judges , and/or their family members, have themselves been 
involved in a family court case. Consider the divorced judge presid-
ing in a marital dissolution case. Will her decision be subject to chal-
lenge based upon that aspect of her personal history? Further, con-
4-8 See Honorable Peggy Fulton Hora, Honorable William Schma and John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Drug Court Movement: Revolutioniting the Criminal Justice ~stem S Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in 
America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999). 
4-9 See Michele Sviridoff, David Rottman, Brian Ostrum and Richard Curtis, DispensingJustice LocalJy, The 
Implementation and Effects of the Midtown Communi9' Court, HARWOOD ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, (2000). 
50 See Leroy L. Kondo, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Issues AnaJysis and Applications: Advocag of the Establishment of Mental 
Health Special9' Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic JUrisprudence for MentalJy fll Offenders, 24 SEATTLE L. REV. 373 
(2000). 
51 See Adam Liptak, Judges Drug Use at Issue in 2 Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002, at AI. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. at AI, A22. 
54- See Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning An Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in FamiJy Law: Application of an 
Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775 (1997)· 
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sider the presiding judge in a delinquency case, whose own child has 
been involved with the juvenile justice system. Does that fact preclude 
him from being impartial, thereby exposing the decision to appellate 
review? Holding judges accountable is a hallmark of our judicial sys-
tem; however, in the quest for accountability, we may jeopardize 
judicial independence in the family courts of this country. 
Judicial Discretion 
The crux of the entire judicial independence dilemma may be soci-
ety's increasing reluctance to allow for judicial discretion in family 
law decision-making. Professor JohnJ. Sampson comments that the 
"establishment of basic family law policies by our elected representa-
tives is preferable to leaving those decisions to lawyers, especially 
gubernatorially appointed lawyers."55 He argues that "even when 
judges are elected, judicial elections virtually never turn on real poli-
cy issues, to say nothing of family law policies."56 In discussing the 
evolution of Texas' joint custody statute, Professor Sampson notes the 
legislative trend to enact detailed custody directives. 57 He predicts a 
legislative trend toward reducing judicial discretion in family law 
matters. 58 
Although Professor Sampson speaks from his experience in one state, 
the issue he raises regarding who should decide what is best for fami-
lies resonates with much of the previous discussion of the factors 
influencing judicial decision-making. With all the private and com-
plicated matters involved in family law cases, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that few of us want a judge to decide them. If the judge is 
authorized to do so, we hold her accountable in ways that constrain 
her independence, whether through detailed legislative directives, 
media publicity, or the power of appointment or election. 
IV. Conclusion 
The resolution of the issue of judicial independence in the family 
court context involves addressing an array of factors that influence a 
judge's decision-making. To be sure, the appointment-election 
conundrum is one important concern; however, its resolution is not 
dispositive of the issue. As discussed earlier, under either selection 
process, family court judges are not free of political concerns, 
whether they are related to an appointment made by a public official 
or the result of election by their local constituents. Furthermore, the 
55 See John J. Sampson, Bringing the Courts to Heel: Substituting Legislative Polig for Judicial Discretion, 33 FAM. L. Q. 
565 (1999). 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 580 See also Robert J. Levy, Trends in Legislative Regulation ofFami!;> Law Doctrine, 33 FAM. L. Q. 543 
(1999). 
58 See Sampson, supra note 55. 
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volatility of family law matters stems from the fact that these issues lie 
at the heart of what we hold most dear, our privacy, our homes, our 
spouses or partners, and our children. The beliefs that accompany 
the issues are closely held, as well, resulting from our own experience 
with a family and our reluctance to allow a third party to decide such 
private matters. 
The context for family law decision-making, thus, is vulnerable to 
scrutiny of the judges' decisions, whether they involve which parent is 
awarded the custody of a child, how the courts handle a juvenile 
delinquent, or whether a marriage is dissolved. This public scrutiny 
constrains the actual independence of the family court judge because 
family law decisions frequently are subject to collective second-guess-
ing. 
The solution proposed to this problem is a relatively simple one, but 
it requires a concerted commitment to change the procedures for 
placing judges in family court and providing support for them while 
they are there. 
First, family court judges should be scrutinized aggressively before 
they become judges. A rigorous standard for judicial selection can be 
implemented, "regardless of whether a given state is an elective state 
or an appointive state."59 Most states require that family court judges 
have backgrounds that are particularly suited to family law. 60 This 
directive should be taken seriously, as it impacts the capacity of a 
judge to make the critical decisions involved in family law adjudica-
tion. It also would further the interests of "professionalizing the 
judiciary," with the hope of convincing the public that "judges ought 
to be selected differently than public officials in the political branch-
es."61 Arguably, if the public has confidence in the wisdom of judges, 
the conflict about judicial discretion 62 in making family law related 
decisions would be reduced. 
Second, family court structures and procedures should be optimized 
to promote independent judicial decision-making. Professor Babb 
suggests that family court reform initiatives promote more informed 
and more independent thinking judges. 
Finally, sitting judges should receive regular and on -going education 
and training in such subjects as family dynamics, domestic violence, 
59 See E. Norman Veasey, The Ma1!)l Facets of the Judicial Independence Diamond, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 779, 787 
(2000). 
60 See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. §3-806 (2002 Replacement Volume). 
61 See Geyh, supra note I, at 33. 
62 See Sampson, supra note 55. 
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and child development in order to promote more public confidence 
in the courts. This, in turn, facilitates the public's willingness to 
allow judges to judge-unhampered by political second guessing and 
personal bias. 
